
TV Maldives has asked me to give them an interview about Black Friday, 13 August 2004. It was the day that a government for which I was its chief spokesperson, declared a state of emergency and locked up the opposition. I rarely say no an interview, so I promptly agreed.
Yet, I do feel some unease about talking about that day; because it is one of the darkest days that I have lived through yet.
No doubt, I rose to political prominence in the Maldives in my role as a government spokesperson, an office that I held from 9 May 2004 to 14 July 2005. Some people (those who wanted immediate regime change) hated me for my performance in that job and others (those who opposed regime change) adored me for the same performance. In that polarised atmosphere, where there was no dialogue amongst opposing groups, and everyone was viewing me through a prism of their own objectives. Very few recognised that I had my own goals for being where I was, and that those had nothing to do with either regime change or regime maintenance. I wanted a democracy with human rights safeguards – a new Maldives. And Professor Samuel Huntington’s The Third Wave: Democratisation in the Late 20th Century, published in 1992, gave me the roadmap to do that – the way to a New Maldives.

I said that Black Friday brings uneasy memories. That is because a lot of people suffered that day and from the events that followed. But, as everyone knows, that was not my doing, and, as many know well, I did my best to mitigate that. Working for a 25-year old outdated and atrophied regime is a perilous task, but I kept a clear conscience. In fact, one of my main roles was to teach the old guard at the “Sitcom” (Situation Committee) how to respond to the Opposition in ways consistent with international norms of democracy and human rights. That is why I can today team up with several victims of that day.
But at the time, few people knew what went on behind the scenes (or the numerous death threats that I received). The people who had a proper perspective of what I was doing were the foreign ambassadors and the international news media, who kept a close dialogue with both the government and the opposition. US Ambassador Lunstead, Colin Hicks at the UK High Commission, Indian High Commissioner Gavai, Dutch Deputy Ambassador van Dyke, as well as Sanjeev Srivastava of BBC, Simon Gardner of Reuters, the late Dilip Ganguly of Associated Press, Amal Jayasinghe of Agence France Presse, Abbas Faiz of Amnesty International to name a few from the summer of 2004, quite well understood and appreciated my role.
What was that role? It was to build bridges of understanding between the Maldives and the international community. It was neither to glorify former President Gayoom nor to demonise current President Nasheed. MDP were quite adept at putting across their side of the argument. But as all rational human beings know, there is always more than one perspective to any human endeavour. And really, as I always say, democracy is a process, not an event.
Of course, being cast in that role, I was being ostracised within my own community of friends: for example, Mahmood Razee and Ali Hashim were among my best buddies, and were very openly MDP. I was not part of the ruling elite, so naturally, my friends and associates felt that I was sacrificing my own future by trying to rescue a sinking ship. So the question all asked was why I was cast in that role?
Among those who asked me that question was Hassan Afeef, former MP for Thaa Atoll, MDP stalwart, and married to a relative of mine.
I explained to Afeef that I quit my foreign service career and took up the post of government spokesman because Gayoom gave me a credible undertaking that he would make the Maldives a modern democracy. I had a clear human rights agenda, and I had a credible undertaking from Gayoom that he would implement that agenda. I had enough reason to believe that he would not wiggle out of that commitment, and I was there to ensure that he did not wiggle out of that commitment. Afeef always protested that Gayoom would never be sincere, and I pledged to Afeef that the day that I came to believe that, I would quit Gayoom and join the opposition.
I explained to him and many others why I, at that time, believed that Gayoom was sincere. On Saturday, 9 August 2003, more than one month before Evan Naseem was murdered, I proposed a Human Rights Commission modelled on the Paris Principles to Gayoom and he accepted it the following day. Today we are all familiar with the Paris Principles; it was I who tied Gayoom down to them, using my position as Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Ministry. At the same time, I had secured Gayoom’s approval to accede to the UN Convention against Torture, and had begun the legal paperwork to do that. Then, on 15 February 2004, at Gayoom’s request, I travelled from New York to London to meet Amnesty International on 16 February to open a dialogue with them and to invite them to the Maldives, and they promptly agreed. I do not know what Gayoom’s motive in all this was—it may have been to improve the country’s image, as he kept on saying, but my intent was to mobilise the international legal framework and Amnesty International to effect lasting human rights reform in the Maldives. I honestly believed there was a lot of scope to make a lot of progress—and a lot of progress we did make.
And in April, Hill and Knowlton were contracted to help with government communications. It defied logic that at small island state would try to hoodwink a premier PR firm – and pay a lot of money while at it! Indeed, H&K were livid about the way the government handled the Black Friday protests.
And in late May, Gayoom confided in me details of what became his reform agenda. He called Shahid, Mohamed Hussain and me to his office and read out the 30-odd points of his reform proposals. They were generally very good, but I did suggest some revisions which he readily incorporated. Later, I met him privately and asked him when he would unveil his proposals. He told me that he would unveil them when he went to inaugurate the People’s Special Majlis- which could be July. I told him that it would be too late; that he should do it immediately before his ideas were leaked and he lost authorship, and that I would organise BBC interviews and other media platforms for him to publicise that.
So on 9 June Gayoom outlined his ideas – much to the chagrin of the old guard cabinet, for I had managed to get Gayoom to by-pass Cabinet approval by going public. Before he spoke, I shot out press releases to the international media that he would unveil an agenda to transform the Maldives into a “liberal democracy”. After he spoke, I proclaimed an “Agenda for Reform, Human Rights and Democracy” through press releases from the SCU. After a few uses of this phrase, objections were raised by the old guard to the use of the word “liberal”, so I began to use variously, “modern democracy”, “working democracy”, “functioning democracy”. All these terms implied that there would be very strong human rights safeguards.
I said my role was to build bridges of understanding between the government and the world. This involved explaining what was happening in the Maldives to the international community. It also involved in equal if not a greater measure, explaining the world to the old guard and making them conduct themselves in ways acceptable to the international community. Because no one was willing to take on the first role, I had quite a lot of influence in the second role, often being able to marginalise the old guard advisors. Often, I was able to predict quite accurately what the pro-democracy activists will do next- my training as a diplomat helped me to listen to the chatter more closely than others in the government did, and it enabled me to avert over-reactions by the Old Guard on many occasions. And I slipped them a copy of Gene Sharp’s handbook From Dictatorship to Democracy, which has been used as a manual by pro-democracy activists of Otpor in Serbia and in the “coloured revolutions” of the early years of this century. (The “Rose Revolution” in Georgia had occurred in November 2003 and perhaps explains why Dr Hussain declared “Finifenma Ingilaab” on Black Friday.)

And it was because of the second role – restraining the Old Guard -- that I did not walk away from the government when it declared emergency on Black Friday. The emergency showed that the Old Guard had lost it, and knew not how to handle the brewing crisis. That would be dangerous for any country. In any case, having done extensive research on the PRG revolution in Grenada, I could not believe that revolutions were the best way to establish democracy.
I was at home when the emergency was declared. I was shocked! Emergency rule has been the norm in Egypt, but in South Asia, it reminds one of the period in India when emergency rule was imposed. It was a traumatic and painful experience in India, and it scared me. When Shahid, my boss at that time, called and asked me to come into the office, I hesitated. I took time to think about it. Something inside me rebelled against the whole notion of emergency rule, especially where opposition MPs are locked up. That is a dangerous path.
As the phone kept ringing, I thought about my decision deeply. I took up the post of chief government spokesperson with a plan, based on Huntington’s seminal work on democratisation. It was Gene Sharp versus Samuel Huntington (and my friend Hussain from Mashhad). Huntington showed that democracy was most durable when it was achieved peacefully and by regime transformation rather than by abrupt replacement. Democracy was a process not an event.
Viewed from that perspective, I saw that the Black Friday was not the endgame, and that the Reform Agenda must still be pushed along. There were pre-planned visits by Amnesty International and by the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs: the former to advocate for human rights and the latter for political pluralism. And left for themselves, and cornered as they were, the Old Guard could lash out even more irrationally and brutally. There was still a role I had to play without selling out my conscience. The process must be pushed forward.
I went to office some 90 minutes after I was summoned.
The first thing I did when I went to office that day was to call Mr Ahmed Mujuthaba of the Human Rights Commission and Mr Minh Pham of the UNDP and invite them to go with me to Jumhooree Maidhan and also to see the condition of the detainees. Mr Minh Pham could not move without approval from New York and the Human Rights Commission, bound by their rules, could not respond because a majority of its members were just leaving for the USA. Mr Mujuthaba did call back ready to go, but by that time, the window had closed. This was an opportunity lost—most of the complaints of ill-treatment related to these initial hours of arrest, and had we been able to visit them, such mistreatment may have been deterred or averted.
Then I did the famous BBC interview where Nasheed and I spoke for the opposition and the government respectively. I did my best to verify the data that were given to me, including personally interviewing a number of senior NSS officers at the scene. I have never knowingly misrepresented the facts, being a student of Joseph Nye and avid believer in his “soft power” thesis, a cardinal principle of which (unlike the Machiavellian precept) is, never lie or deceive, for credibility is of utmost value.

Today, I do not regret my role during and after the emergency. When I had to announce the charges against the detainees, I spoke in the third person because I found the charges quite repulsive. My job was simply that of a reporter of a charge-sheet. But behind the scenes, I did my best to bind the hands of the old-guard. I by-passed the Foreign Minister and allowed the first EU mission to visit the detainees at Dhoonidhoo. The second time, I was overruled and the Foreign Minister met the EU delegation and fought with them, blocked access to detainees and attacked the EU in a press release against my advice and invited the condemnation of the EU. Perhaps without my intervention, the regime would have fallen faster; but regime change, an event, did not equate with democracy, and a new regime would have many priorities other than reform.
A 25-old regime would be under a lot of international pressure to either reform or get out. A new regime would be given a lot of time before pressure is put on it to pursue reform. A dying regime would be under intense international pressure to quickly build democratic institutions. A new regime will have a lot of space for excuses. So logically, a dying regime must sell a lot of reform to buy time; a new regime need not sell as much reform to buy time. But of course, it was highly unlikely, but not impossible, that a 30 year-old regime can reinvent itself and buy another term; and I don’t doubt MDP’s commitment to human rights.
My role in explaining to the old guard how the modern world worked meant that I had to do a lot of intervention in domestic matters—lecturing the Home Minister and others of the infamous Sitcom.
On at least 2 occasions, I threatened to quit if I did not get my way on leniency or release for detained activists (on one occasion, on 5 June 2005, I even copied my threat to Ali Hashim, that I would resign if Anni was not returned home before 6 pm that day and Haruge re-opened by the same deadline).
Very often, I would engineer visits by the Jail Inspection Committee (on which Afeef and Aminath Didi served) to investigate reports of the status or wellbeing of political detainees. It was for this reason that often I received calls from family and friends of political detainees to intercede with President Gayoom on behalf of several detainees. (But of course, these behind-the-scene moves were not well-known, as you can see from the entry in DO on 7 June 2005 as “Letter from Dylan: A letter to the good doctor, Phd, on certain events on the night of 5 June” See http://www.dhivehiobserver.com/letters/Good-doctor-maldives07060056.htm )
The international community did not take sides in domestic political disputes. Their interest was in advancing reform. Sappe of DO and I would frequently debate on BBC TV or elsewhere on what should come first, reform or regime change. At the end of the day, this was what divided me from MDP then and later from DRP. Where I put reform ahead of regime change, MDP found me an obstacle; where I was willing to risk regime security for reform, DRP found me a threat.
Ultimately, it was my sense that there was a great opportunity to pursue reform in the Maldives that did not lead to me to quit the Maldives when many political heavyweights abandoned Gayoom in the months following Black Friday – for them, it was the endgame, or so they thought. For me, this was the last chance to usher in a modern democracy without bloodshed. Already, as it subsequently turned out, the change has been revolutionary enough; but it has still been smooth. Regime change without reform would have been far worse than whatever has happened since Black Friday. And it was the promise of that peaceful transition of power that kept me going even in the bleakest days following Black Friday.
Anyone remember the famous debate that MDP Chair Nasheed and I had at Giyasuddin School Hall on 30 June 2005? Nasheed said all that was necessary was regime change; and I said reforms were more important. Mercifully, what we got was both regime change and reform. Both of us remember Lord Acton’s famous quote: “Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely; there is no worse hearsay than that the office sanctifies the holder of it.” On this, we both agree, and always have.
For the past several months, I have been advocating the erection of a memorial for victims of torture. As that memorial goes up, I want to remind my erstwhile colleagues on the Sitcom that the reason that they today have the right to remain silent, the right to legal representation, the right to protest peacefully, the right to actively oppose the government and many of the other rights that they enjoy today are the result largely of the reform process of the past five years. And I am sure that the most important thing today for those who were locked up 5 years ago is to find ways to make people power durable—and the way to achieve it is by building institutions. The process must go on.
Ahmed Shaheed for OSA
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