Vision of India-Maldives Relations in the Context of Democratisation in the Maldives

I recently visited New Delhi on an official visit and was invited to speak at the Indian Council of World Affairs. I have received a number of requests from various people for a copy of the speech, especially after it was cited by many speakers at the recently held seminar in Male on Social Political Transformation.Here I was speaking as Foreign Minister and therefore necessarily had to comply with various diplomatic norms


Dear Excellencies, Friends, Ladies and Gentlemen:

I am delighted to be here today especially in the presence of so many friends of the Maldives, many of whom are distinguished diplomats who have contributed immensely to the development of the strong friendship between India and the Maldives.

Allow me also to thank the Indian Council on Foreign Relations for inviting me to speak here today about India-Maldives relations.

I am always eager to visit India because India is such a great friend of the Maldives, and a sound India-Maldives relationship forms the cornerstone of a successful foreign policy for the Maldives. When we dial 911, it is New Delhi at the other end of the line: from Operation Cactus of 1988 to the post-tsunami rescue attempts in 2004 to emergency economic assistance in 2009. It was on this basis that I articulated the notion of an “India First” foreign policy on my first visit to India as foreign minister in August 2005. It is also based on the fact that we are an integral part of South Asia. It is through a South Asian lens that we must view the world.

Today, as foreign minister of the new government, I would like to re-affirm the same policy commitment, representing a bipartisan or national consensus on that doctrine. In actual fact, my topic today is how the change in the way the Maldives is governed, namely the democratic transition of last November, is going to affect the evolution of India-Maldives relations.

Let me begin with a snapshot of India-Maldives relations. India and the Maldives have always enjoyed very warm and cordial ties, based on the principles enshrined in the UN Charter, such as the sovereign equality of states and non-interference in the internal affairs of states, the spirit of Bandung with its emphasis on Third World Solidarity and South-South co-operation, the values of the Commonwealth which stress democracy and human rights, and the goals of the SAARC Charter which focus on peace, development and prosperity. But ahead of all that, the friendship is based on centuries of cultural and commercial relations, shared norms and values, and geographical proximity. In recent decades, especially since Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and Prime Minister Ahmed Zaki exchanged visits in 1974-75, a strong partnership has emerged, covering a whole range of areas and issues, from trade and finance, transport and communication, to education and security. Thirty-five years later, having built a major partnership during the Gayoom presidency, India-Maldives relationship is again poised to enter a new phase of rapid expansion, as a consequence of the momentous changes underway in the Maldives.

I argue that democratisation of the Maldives will increase both the need as well as the opportunity for a deeper and broader engagement between India and the Maldives. When I say democratisation, I do not refer merely to the election result. Democracy is not an event, it is a process, often a painstaking process, and the democracy-building process in the Maldives will require a broad engagement with India. I am not aiming today to give an exhaustive treatment of the topic, but to provide a perspective from the Maldives, covering the most crucial impacts that will follow from democratisation.

Indeed, the Maldives today is at a critical crossroads. The election result last year produced a giant leap for the Maldives, and we now have one foot on the path to a democratic and prosperous Maldives.

But that is only a first step in democracy-building and, behind us, the footprints of authoritarian rule are more deeply ingrained and enduring than those left on the moon by the crew of Apollo-11 this week forty years ago.

At the same time, on our flanks, on the one-hand are the perils of economic stagnation and social malaise, corruption and impunity, drugs and lawlessness on the slippery slope of what Professor Larry Diamond at Stanford University calls a “predatory society”, where politics becomes a zero sum game, often a matter of life and death.

On the other flank are the perils of intolerance, bigotry and extremism, where politics has no place at all. It will be difficult to navigate past all this on our own.

And to make matters worse, in a democratic transition, things tend to get worse before they get better; the path to democracy dips down before it lifts up. This has been amply demonstrated by Samuel Huntington’s study of democratisation of what he calls the Third Wave countries—those that achieved democratic transitions between 1974 and 1993. We might not be an exception.

Building democracy requires fostering of civic communities with high degrees of social capital based on trust and networks of co-operation. It requires institutions that support rule of law, accountability and equal opportunity. It requires the conversion of what has been called “predatory societies” with rampant corruption and abuse of power, into societies that foster pluralism, constitutionalism, social harmony and prosperity.

But let me place the Maldives situation in context: I am not being alarmist about the prospects for the future. I just want to be realistic about expectations and focus on addressing the challenges rather than ignoring them. The notion of the “J-curve” is an instructive one just as the concept of transition from a predatory society to a civic community provides a guide to action.

What is the J-curve? The notion of a J-curve for democratic transition relates to the thesis advanced by Ian Bremmer in his book called The J Curve: A New Way to Understand Why Nations Rise and Fall. It depicts the relationship between a country’s “stability” and its “openness”. The curve demonstrates the path the countries go through as they proceed towards greater openness.

Some states, such as North Korea and Iran, argues Bremmer, are stable only because they are relatively closed. In these countries, governments strive hard to insulate citizens from the outside world -- and, where possible, from one another. By contrast, some other countries such as Canada, India, Germany, the United States, Japan, Switzerland and many others are stable precisely because they are open societies.

The idea of a curve is that when a country whose stability depends on being closed finally, for whatever reason, begins to open up, it slides down the left side of the curve toward the dip in the J, a point of maximum vulnerability before it rises up the right side of the curve. A country cannot progress from left (closed) to right (open) along the J without passing through that dip. Bremmer demonstrates that in the real world, if relatively closed countries like Uzbekistan, or Burma decided to open up a bit by holding genuinely free and fair national elections with full coverage in local media, they would almost certainly “reap the whirlwind”. That is often the reason why the governments of closed states resist or quickly withdraw from efforts to attain moderate reforms towards greater openness.

Recently I made some comments on the applicability of the J-curve to the Maldives predicament, and Mr Bremmer responded by agreeing with my worries about the challenges that the Maldives faces in consolidating democracy: In an article in Foreign Policy entitled, “As Go the Maldives, So Goes the World,” he wrote in May this year:
“Worsening economic conditions have exacerbated pre-existing political problems in Russia, Ukraine, Pakistan, Turkey, Mexico, Argentina and many other countries. All these states have begun to slide toward the dip in the J curve and the turmoil it represents. And all those who hold political power in these countries must decide how their governments should respond. They can hunker down, build new walls, and favor near-term stability at the expense of investment in longer-term prosperity. Or they can double down on the power of free markets and international trade to expand their economic horizons and continue to engage with other governments in finding solutions to seemingly intractable common problems.

There is nothing inevitable about globalization's progress. There are plenty of political officials around the world, insecure in their positions, with obvious motives to advance populist/nationalist/protectionist arguments at the expense of trade, foreign investment, and immigration. But if a state's leaders and lawmakers turn their backs on the increasingly free exchange of ideas, information, people, money, goods and services, its citizens -- and the global economy -- will only be the poorer for it.”

We in the Maldives take these warnings very seriously. We cannot be complacent or take for granted that a democratic transition will mean that everything will be hunky dory in the Maldives the next day. Even at the best of times -- and global economic recession makes these terribly bad times for infant democracies -- democracy-building is a painstaking process which takes effort and time.

I am not about to make excuses for the democratic deficits that exist in the Maldives, but rather to acknowledge their existence and to set the context within which these can be addressed. The J-curve instructs us to persist with the reforms and seek greater openness, to go past the dip in the curve despite enormous difficulties, and to stay the course for democracy.

Our history especially, dictates that we should take great care to stay the course. Thrice in the past 80 years, in 1933, in 1953 and in 1989-90, the Maldives had taken important steps towards political modernisation, and thrice retreated back towards autocracy in the face of economic and political difficulties. And the spirit of reform did not rebound for at least two decades on each occasion.

In 1933, within about 7 months of proclaiming the country’s first constitution, the people tore up the constitution and banished the reformers. The old guard found that a constitution provided for a very strange and inconvenient way to govern.
In 1953, the First Republic ended just after 7 months with the arrest and subsequent fatal mobbing of the President. People associated democracy with economic hardship and disorienting socio-cultural changes.

In 1989-90, in the aftermath of Operation Cactus, there was a period of few months when the media were free, dissident politicians could be heard, and corrupt politicians had to flee. However, the genie of liberty was put back in the bottle, again in about 7 months. The take-home message for the general public was that freedoms were dangerous and destabilising.

The times that we face today are perhaps more challenging than before, given the global economic situation. Yet at the same time, the determination to stay the course is stronger -- I could say that a critical mass of people today are weighing in on the side of political openness. Moreover, the international commitment to support the Maldives in its march towards democracy is unprecedented.

The requirements of these trying times, to keep pushing forward along the J-curve towards the right side of the curve, will obviously dominate the bilateral agenda with all our development partners. And so is the case therefore with India. The challenge is to sustain the momentum along the curve without retreating, and also to avoid falling off the curve, into a situation where the country descends into the worst form of what has been called a “predatory society” -- a failed state where life becomes, in the Hobbesian sense, “nasty, brutish and short” for the people of the Maldives.

The notion of a predatory society described by Professor Larry Diamond in his book The Spirit of Democracy indeed provides a useful tool to shape the dialogue between the Maldives and its development partners. The related concept of a civic community, as described by Robert Putnam, identifies where our energies may best be focused on democracy-building.

A predatory society is one in which there is rampant corruption, lack of accountability, where political struggles become an all-or-nothing struggle:
In Diamond’s words:

“[In a predatory society] there is no real community, no shared commitment to any common vision of the public good, and no respect for law. Behavior is cynical and opportunistic. Those who capture political power seek to monopolize it and the rents that flow from it … officials feed on the state and the powerful prey on the weak. The rich extract wealth from the poor and deprive them of public goods. Corruption is widely regarded as the norm, political participation is mobilized from above, civic engagement is meagre, compromise is scarce, and nearly everyone feels powerless, exploited, and unhappy.”

Diamond adds:
“The predatory society cannot sustain democracy, for sustainable democracy requires constitutionalism, compromise, and respect for the law. Neither can it generate sustainable economic growth, for that requires actors with financial capital to invest in productive activity. In the predatory society, people do not get rich through productive activity and honest risk taking; they get rich by manipulating power and privilege, by stealing from the state, by extracting from the weak, and by shirking the law.

And politics is a zero-sum life and death struggle:

“Political actors in the predatory society will use any means and break any rules in the quest for power and wealth. Politicians in the predatory society bribe electoral officials, beat up opposition campaigners, and assassinate opposing candidates. Presidents silence criticism and eliminate their opponents by legal manipulation, arrest, or murder. Ministers worry first about the rents they can collect and only second about whether the equipment they are purchasing or the contract they are signing has any value for the public.”

Institutions are a facade:

“Legislators collect bribes to vote for bills. The police do not enforce the law. Judges do not decide the law. Customs officials do not inspect the goods. Manufacturers do not produce, bankers do not invest, borrowers do not repay, and contracts do not get enforced. Any actor with discretionary power is a rent-seeker.”

I am neither claiming nor denying that the above depiction is a true image of the Maldives at any time. Clearly, many elements of it have been observable in the Maldives. What I would say is that there are many who have argued that things were either as bad or worse in the Maldives, and that they constitute a sizeable number. Perception clearly matters, and what you believe is what you see. So an objective abstract reality, which may or may not differ from the perception, is less important than the conviction that corruption and impunity were rampant. That clearly points to the absence of a civic community in which accountability and trust play a major part.

The challenge for democratisation therefore is to foster a civic community, by developing independent institutions, promoting rule of law, enhancing oversight and accountability mechanisms, increasing transparency, strengthening media freedom, ensuring independence of the judiciary, and promoting the spirit of bargaining, compromise and accommodation. These are clearly laudable goals in themselves, but they can also become the means to promote inward investment and economic and political opportunity for all. Once again, the bilateral agenda with development partners must focus on fostering these goals. As a vibrant democracy, India is well placed to promote democracy in the Maldives, without which there can be no acceleration of economic development in the Maldives or long-term stability and durable peace.

Thus, these two concepts, the notion of the J-Curve and the challenge of transforming a predatory society into a civic community are useful tools in thinking about how the India-Maldives relationship will develop in the context of democratisation in the Maldives. The exposure to instability will draw in India’s involvement in a number of areas where co-operation will be sought by the Maldives. These will focus on mitigating vulnerability to all sorts of threats, and therefore emphasising security co-operation and police collaboration. It is no coincidence that these areas have dominated recent discussions and have been attached high priority by the both India and the Maldives.

There is a long history of security co-operation between India and Maldives, from Operation Cactus onwards. But such co-operation now needs to be expanded to cover new and emerging threats, co-eval with but not necessarily related to democratisation, such as enhanced maritime surveillance and security. Reports of Somali pirates seizing ships within the EEZ of Seychelles and the sea-borne terrorist attack on Mumbai on 26/11, are all wake-up calls for the Maldives. So, one key aspect of the bilateral dialogue will focus on strengthening the resilience of the Maldives against various security threats, from poaching to organised crime and terrorism. The collaboration will also need to extend to enhancing the capacity of the police to operate in a democratic and pluralistic environment.

The people will not sense that democracy has improved their lot until functionally the government starts to deliver better services, whether in terms of job creation, health care and utilities. Functional co-operation in these areas and the mobilisation of investment will also remain high priority issues in the bilateral agenda. In addition to official level engagements, the process of opening up the Maldives and the advocacy of privatisation will increase the opportunity for deeper and broader economic collaboration between India and the Maldives. The high profile delegation of the Confederation of Indian Industry that visited the Maldives in February and the 15 MOUS that were signed represent the spirit of the times, and the opportunities that exist for wider engagement. Likewise, the prompt response given by India to the request for emergency economic aid by the new government demonstrates an appreciation of the continuing 911 role of India. The emergency standby loan facility and other economic and trade concessions given to assist the Maldives highlight the increasingly important role of India in nurturing the new democracy.

But the inward investments will not come without a conducive environment, which depends on institutional and social capital. Changing the political culture will take a long time, but building institutions requires a shorter time frame. As a vibrant democracy, India can contribute tremendously to building the institutional capital of the Maldives, through capacity building of horizontal accountability mechanisms: an independent and professional judiciary, a credible anti-corruption commission, an effective auditor-general and a functionally effective parliament. The development of these mechanisms will also open up lucrative opportunities for Indian investors and foster greater economic collaboration.

One outcome of democracy in the Maldives will also be the development of multi-sector and multi-actor dialogues between the two countries. To date, although large numbers of citizens of both counties live in each other’s country, the main focus is on the ties between the two governments. Over time, the dialogue will be more varied, will involve the civil society of the two countries more frequently and prominently, and develop a broader relationship between the two countries. Both countries are encouraging such contact, because of the potential benefit for both countries in terms of fostering better understanding and greater South-South co-operation. Broadening the engagement will also contribute to strengthening vertical accountability mechanisms necessary to build a vibrant civic community in the Maldives—such as the development of a professional and alert media, development of political parties, issue-based non-government organisations and empowerment of the people. The vast expertise and intellectual resources of India as well as its rich civil society sector can contribute tremendously to enhancing vertical accountability or people power in the Maldives.

My conclusion is that democratisation in the Maldives requires a stronger, deeper and broader bilateral relationship between India and the Maldives, since it is in India’s interest to ensure that peace and stability prevail in its neighbourhood and in the interest of the Maldives to have an ally in dealing with a host of challenges that the country faces.

The opening up of closed societies is often accompanied by instability, and the management of that transition over the next decade or so will tend to dominate India-Maldives relations. Indian foreign policy is not evangelical: it does not tell its neighbours how to govern. But India cannot avoid that dialogue with its neighbours, from the sheer fact of proximity, and also because of shared interests, the SAARC project and the growing volume of transnational traffic.

Beyond the direct impacts of democracy, there are global trends that will also have an impact on India-Maldives relations, especially as they affect the national security of the two countries. There are a range of global phenomena that affect the national interests of the two countries, ranging from piracy and terrorism to sea-level rise. Then there are the traditional or strategic “games” that nations play, in which India and Maldives need to operate as a tag-team. This has been the spirit in which India and the Maldives have collaborated and co-ordinated positions in multilateral forums, and nearer home, given primacy to the SAARC project.
In short, my forecast is for a more intensified engagement. My recommendation is that both states seek to structure the relationship in ways that will provide an abiding focus on common interests and informed dialogue so that the bilateral agenda remains stable even as the Maldives rides the J-curve, and pursues democratic consolidation.
___________